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Abstract
This paper develops a simple model to examine conditions under which a monetary policy-
making authority is tempted to “follow the market.” In doing so, we explore the implications
of increased market-consensus on the practice of monetary policy and show that ineﬃciency
in policymaking is most likely precisely when there is a very high consensus that economic
fundamentals are weak or strong. In addition, our results also shed light on (i) why interest
rates may not be high enough even when the central bank’s information suggests a rise in
asset prices may be due to ‘bubble’ shock; (ii) why a central banker may be reluctant to
adopt a loose monetary policy even when investors seem to be very pessimistic about the
path of future output; and (iii) why, contrary to conventional models, we sometimes observe
an upward revision of private sector’s forecasts of inﬂation when the central bank tightens its
monetary policy. The results have implications for transparency of monetary policy.
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The conduct of monetary policy is often compounded by the central banker’s lack of information
about the economic environment. It is in such an uncertain environment, that policymakers
have typically had to negotiate between the Scylla of low output growth and the Charybdis of
inﬂation. However, the worldwide growth of ﬁnancial markets and the advent of the informa-
tion technology revolution has changed matters — reducing the uncertainty, and increasing the
consensus among investors, about the future path of the economy. Indeed, it has been suggested
that this reduction in uncertainty together with the growth of ﬁnancial markets has the ability
to inﬂuence the direction of monetary policy. This is argued most succinctly by Blinder (1998,
p.60), who observed that:
“Central bankers are often tempted to ‘follow the markets’, that is to deliver the interest
rate path that the markets have embedded in asset prices. Living in a central bank for a
while has taught me how this temptation arises. Central bankers are only human; they want
to earn high marks — from whomever is handing out the grades. While the only verdict
that matters is the verdict of history, it takes an amazingly strong constitution to wait that
long .... Following the markets may be a nice way to avoid unsettling surprises, which is a
legitimate end in itself. But I fear it may produce rather poor monetary policy .... Central
bankers must inoculate themselves against whimsy and keep an eye on fundamentals.”
In this paper, we examine the role of uncertainty and market opinion in inﬂuencing monetary
policy. In particular, we ask whether the monetary authority is ever tempted to “follow the
market” by delivering policies that the market expects to see, rather than what is socially optimal?
We develop a simple framework that captures this strategic interaction between a monetary
authority and investors. We consider a situation where the monetary authority and investors
are uncertain about the economy’s underlying state of fundamentals. This could stem from a
good productivity shock to the economy that raises its future output, or a bad shock that has
the opposite eﬀect. However, the exact nature of the shock becomes known only after policies
and investment decisions have been made. Monetary policy is therefore contingent on the central
bank’s information about economic fundamentals.
This state-contingent nature of policy itself would not result in any ineﬃciency, was it not for
the assumption that the monetary authority has some private information about the underlying
economic environment. While this assumption is easy to justify in an emerging market context,
the evidence in Romer and Romer (2000) and Ellingsen and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001) suggest that such
informational asymmetry can exist even in an advanced economy. In particular, the results in
Romer and Romer (2000) show that commercial forecasters of inﬂation modify their forecasts in
response to the Federal Reserve’s policy, indicating that interest rate policy contains information
1beyond what is known by commercial forecasters. They also ﬁnd that the Federal Reserve seem
to possess additional information about the path of future output. Romer and Romer attributes
this informational asymmetry to the vast amount of resources the Federal Reserve devotes to
forecasting economic trends.1
The analysis in this paper is quite distinct from earlier papers on monetary policy in the
presence of asymmetric information about economic shocks (e.g., Canzoneri (1985) and Garﬁnkel
and Oh (1993)). The main diﬀerence between these earlier papers (and, in fact, most of the
literature on the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy) is that in our framework, private
sector’s actions take place only after the monetary policy decision is known. It therefore shifts
the time inconsistency problem of the type highlighted in the standard models (e.g., Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a,b)), to one that involves credibility of the
central bank’s information.2
The key feature that investment decisions are made after the direction of monetary policy is
known, gives rise to a signaling game between the monetary authority and market participants.
In our model, the central bank’s interest rate policy provides a signal to the market about the
state of the economy. Hence, as noted by Woodford (2003 p.15), the success of monetary policy
depends on its ability to shape “market expectations of the way in which interest rates, inﬂation
and income are likely to evolve” in the future. However, there is a second aspect to an interest
rate policy as a signal. In particular, the choice of interest rate also serves as a signal to the
market of the monetary authority’s conﬁdence in a particular course of action.
If investors are suﬃciently uncertain about the underlying state of the economy, then mon-
etary policy will be eﬃcient. This is because the central bank recognizes that the signal that
1Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999, 2003) also show that conﬁdential supervisory information about the
ﬁnancial health of non-publicly traded banks that guides monetary policy can be another source of the Federal
Reserve’s informational advantage. However, Faust, Swanson and Wright (2003) did not ﬁnd any evidence that
Federal Reserve policies reveal any superior information about most macroeconomic statistics to the private sector.
But, in general, public statements by the Federal Reserve do attract lots of investor attention partly because the
Fed is typically perceived to have private information about the economy.
2In the Kydland and Prescott-type models, the private sector form their expectations of inﬂation based on what
they expect the central bank to do. And since any commitment on the part of the central bank to keep inﬂation
low is not credible, the private sector expects a high inﬂation. Recently, both academics and policymakers have
become more skeptical about whether the Kydland-Prescott game really captures the credibility problem that the
central bank is generally thought to face: e.g., McCallum (1995), Blinder (1998), and Vickers (1999). Using a
model that also assumes that the state of the economy becomes known only after economic decisions and policy
has been undertaken, Cukierman (2000) derives an inﬂation-bias result without appealing to inﬂation surprises.
However, in addition to adopting the standard timing of events — whereby agents act (by forming expectations)
before the policy is implemented — Cukierman also assumes that the central bank takes “far more political heat
when it tightens preemptively to avoid inﬂation than when it eases preemptively to avoid higher unemployment”
(Blinder (1998 p.19)). So the central bank’s objective function is assumed to be more sensitive to the cost of
recessions. The inﬂation bias result in his paper disappears without this assumption.
2its policy conveys will be the predominant source of information to investors. Hence, it has an
incentive to choose the eﬃcient policy; which completely reveals its information to investors.
However if investors are either very pessimistic or optimistic about the economy, then ineﬃ-
ciencies in policymaking can occur. For example, when investors are very optimistic about the
future path of output, a relevant consideration is that by contradicting the market’s and his own
prior, the policymaker could be signaling that he is no longer conﬁdent about the appropriate
course of action. It is this fear of the economic consequences of being perceived as uncertain and
lacking conﬁdence about the economic environment, that results in the policymaker’s choice of
an ineﬃcient policy.
In contrast, when investors believe that the underlying fundamentals of the economy are
weak, the central banker’s dilemma is very diﬀerent. Here, the choice of a low interest rate to
stimulate the economy, may conﬁrm the negative priors that investors have of a weak economy,
resulting in a much lower investment and output levels.3 So the central bank may be tempted
to implement a tighter policy as a signal that the economy is stronger. But, as we shall see, this
higher interest rate policy causes investors to revise their expectation of inﬂation upwards — a
result that accords very well with the evidence in Cook and Hahn (1989) and Romer and Romer
(2000).
Hence, when put together, our model provides a framework that can be used to simultaneously
throw light on the following:
(i) why the central bank may not raise interest rates suﬃciently high, even though its private
information suggests that an increase in asset prices may be due to a ‘bubble’ shock;
(ii) why the central bank may behave conservatively and reluctant to lower interest rates suf-
ﬁciently when investors are “pessimistic” about future output; and
(iii) why we sometimes observe an increase in the private sector’s forecasts of inﬂation when
the central tightens its monetary policy.
Our emphasis on the importance of uncertainty in generating ineﬃciency in monetary policy
is shared with Caplin and Leahy (1996). Caplin and Leahy focus on aggregate uncertainty, where
they delineate the ineﬃciency associated with an uncertain Federal Reserve’s gradual search for
the optimal policy. In a dynamic framework they show that gradual policy cuts of the central
3Such claims are commonly made in the ﬁnancial press. For example, Jess Eisinger noted in the Ahead of the
Tape column of the May 6, 2003 issue of the Wall Street Journal, that “The downside of cutting rates is clear: It
might panic the market into thinking that Sir Alan [Greenspan] no longer believes in the coming economic bounce
he’s been predicting.”
3bank are ineﬀectual as investors anticipate further rate cuts and hence delay investing. While
this result is similar in ﬂavor to (ii) above, we should emphasize that our focus is on private
information in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. Thus, we view this result as complementing
Caplin and Leahy’s.
Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe (2003) also provide a dynamic model with ﬂuctuating state of the
economy. In each period, the monetary authority observes the state of the economy, but investors
do not. However, Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe were more interested in a diﬀerent set of issues:
namely, how much discretion the monetary authority should be allowed to have in the conduct
of its policy. They then determine constraints (e.g., inﬂation targets) that can be imposed on
the monetary authority in order to mitigate her desire to use discretionary policy to stimulate
the economy through inﬂation surprises. Our analysis is much simpler and has a diﬀerent focus:
Because we assume that investors act only after they have observed the direction of monetary
policy, our analysis is aimed speciﬁcally at the way investors’ prior beliefs, and a greater market
consensus about the economy, inﬂuences monetary policy and macroeconomic outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2 and provide
the equilibrium analysis in section 3. In section 4, we discuss the policy implications of our results
and how they relate to the standard models that emphasize the time-inconsistency problem of
monetary policymaking. We conclude the paper in section 5. Proofs of all results are in an
appendix.
2 The Framework
We construct a simple, static model to capture some of the essential aspects of monetary policy-
making, as witnessed in the past few decades. We analyze the strategic interaction between the
policymaker (the monetary authority) and investors. The aim of our analysis is to focus on the
key inﬂuence that investors’ expectations have on the direction of monetary policy.
2.1 Description of the Model
Consider an economy that could be in one of two states: a good (G) or a bad (B) state, but
the exact nature of the state is revealed only after economic decisions have been made. For
example, a good underlying state corresponds to an economic environment where the returns
to investment (and hence output and aggregate demand) are relatively high. Conversely, a bad
state will be characterized by low aggregate economic activity. We capture this by assuming that
total output in state S is given by Y = SKα, where K is the level of investment, α ∈ (0,1) and
4the productivity level S = {G,B}, with G > B > 0. We assume that the market’s prior that the
state is good is P(G) = ω.
In order to facilitate the analysis, we transform these relationships into a logarithmic form
by letting y = lnY and k = lnK, so that we can think of y as the growth in output. We then
deﬁne yS as the (exogenous) “potential” output level in state S: that is, yS = lnS +αkS, where
kS is corresponding full-employment investment level in state S, with kG > kB. For simplicity,
we restrict the fundamental diﬀerence between the two states by assuming that α(kG −kB) = 1.
As we shall see below, this state-dependence of the economic environment and the potential level
of output is consistent with economic models with an unknown natural rate of unemployment.4
We assume that inﬂation is determined by the output gap in the following equation5:
π = E[π|Ω] + β(y − yS), (1)
where y is determined from the production function and β > 0 (a constant) measures the output
gap eﬀect on inﬂation. Investors’ expectation of inﬂation is given by E[π|Ω], and the set Ω
contains any information that is publicly observed or inferred from the interest rate policy. Since
our model is static, we assume that aggregate demand equals the output level in equilibrium:
i.e., yd = y.
An appealing aspect of this reduced-form formulation is that it captures in a parsimonious
way the state-dependence of inﬂation: inﬂation will exceed investors’ expectations whenever
a loose monetary policy leads to an excessive investment and an over-expansion; or whenever
the economy is wrongly perceived to be operating below its potential level — i.e., when yS is
thought to be high, when it is in fact low (as was suggested by Orphanides (2001) to be the case
in the 1970s). On the other hand, a positive supply shock implies a higher yS, so that for any
given policy, there is a reduction in the level of inﬂation. So, yS can be considered as the non-
accelerating inﬂation rate of output growth in state S. Our framework is therefore a convenient
simpliﬁcation of the eﬀect of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables.
Finally, we follow the literature by assuming that the monetary authority seeks to balance
its goal of stabilizing inﬂation around zero, while promoting high output growth. That is, the
central bank sets its interest rate policy to maximize a welfare function given by:
V = λy − (π − π)2/2, (2)
4For example, our framework is consistent with evidence suggesting that, at any time, there exist a large
amount of uncertainty concerning the natural rate of unemployment (e.g., Staiger, Stock and Watson (1994) and
Gordon (1997)). A sequence of inﬂuential papers by Orphanides (2001, 2002) also ﬁnd that the Federal Reserve
systematically misperceived the state of the economy, especially in the 1970s.
5See, for example, Walsh (2002) for a similar formulation.
5where λ > 0 captures the central bank’s relative concern for output, and π is the inﬂation target,
which we assume to be zero (see, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983b) and Walsh (2003,
chap.8)).6
The timing of events is very simple, and depicted in Figure 1. We assume the initial price
level is Po = 1. Then the economy is hit by (an uncertain) productivity shock, S. The central
bank observes a private signal about the shock and choose an interest rate policy. Investors then
form expectations about the state of the economy and choose the level of investment, taking
prices as given. In the last stage, the uncertainty about the shock is revealed, and output and
inﬂation are realized.
Initial price, Po = 1;
shock occurs
Bank sees private




y and π are known
0 1 2 3
Figure 1: Timing of events
This also makes the model’s mechanics very straightforward: the central bank implements a
discretionary interest policy which determines the level of aggregate investment. The investment
level then determines the output level, which equals aggregate demand in equilibrium. And
ﬁnally, inﬂation (and hence, price level) is determined by equation (1).
It is important to clarify how our model diﬀers from the standard framework for analyzing
monetary policy games (e.g., Barro and Gordon (1983b)). In the standard models, the central
bank is assumed to choose the inﬂation rate — either directly or through its choice of the growth
of money supply — after the private sector has formed its expectation of inﬂation. Output is then
determined by an expectation-augmented Phillips equation of the form: y = y +θ(π −E[π])+,
where y is potential output, θ is a positive constant and  denotes a supply shock. In the absence
of a supply shock, output exceeds its potential only when there are inﬂation surprises. Our
structure is diﬀerent. First, because expectations are formed after the policy is observed, we
need a diﬀerent channel through which policy aﬀects output. This is accomplished by letting
the central bank follow an interest rate policy (rather than target money supply), which in turn
inﬂuences the level of investment and output through the production function. Hence, in addition
6The algebra gets a bit more complicated if we assume the central bank minimizes a quadratic loss function.
But the results are qualitatively the same.
6to its realism, our description of the timing of events is probably more in accordance with how
we view the process of monetary policymaking.
In our framework, it would seem that policymaking for the monetary authority is a simple
enough task. All that the policymaker has to do is to choose an interest rate that is ‘appropriately’
matched to the underlying economic environment — be it more or less productive. However, what
makes this otherwise straightforward task diﬃcult, is that the state of the world is not perfectly
known. Given this uncertainty, the signals conveyed by the central bank’s policy about the
underlying economic environment will be important.
In making his assessment of the appropriate policy choice, the policymaker has two sources of
information about the underlying state. First, the policymaker is aware that the prior probability
that the economy is in the good state is P(G) = ω. This assessment of the productivity of the
economic environment is shared by all investors and market participants. In addition, we assume
that the policymaker has access to some additional private information about the underlying
economic environment. In particular, we assume that the central bank receives an informative
private signal, s, about state of the economy; s = g or b. If the economy is good (bad), then it is
more likely that the signal will be good (bad); i.e., the reliability of the private signal is given by
P(s = g|G) = P(s = b|B) = φ > 1/2. Finally, we assume that φ > ω so that the policymaker’s
private signal is more informative than the public signal. This assumption implies that the
posteriors are unbalanced, in that P(G|g) > P(G|b). It also means that the limit of P(G|b) (or
P(G|g)) with respect to both the strength (or weakness) of the prior ω, and the strength of the
private signal φ, approaches 1
2. That is, limφ→1,ω→0 P(G|g) = 1
2 and limφ→1,ω→1 P(G|b) = 1
2. [See
proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix for more details]. Intuitively, the posterior probability is more
balanced when the prior and the signal strongly conﬂict each other. As will soon be evident, it
is the monetary policymaking authority’s uncertainty when its signal conﬂicts with the market’s
prior, that gives rise to an incentive to make ineﬃcient policy choices.7
7The qualitative feature of our results will remain the same, if instead, we assume that the productivity shock,
and the associated signals, are continuous. In that case, equation (1) will be written as π = E[π|Ω]+β(y −y)+ξ,
where y is the potential output level, and ξ is a shock [See, for example, Walsh (2002) and Jensen (2003)]. If
we deﬁne y =
1




2 ]. Hence our model can
be said to encapsulate the idea of a varying “natural” output growth. This alternative formulation will however
make the analysis less tractable without adding any additional insight. As we shall see, a necessary condition
for ineﬃciencies in policymaking to arise in our model is that there is a signiﬁcant amount of consensus among
investors about the state of the economy.
73 Equilibrium Analysis
We are interested in analyzing the (Bayesian) Nash equilibria to the signaling game. In such
an equilibrium, the policymaking monetary authority adopts a payoﬀ maximizing behavioral
strategy that describes interest rate r(ω,s), taking into account the amount of investment such
a policy choice will elicit, and its eﬀect on inﬂation. We assume ﬁrms operate in a competitive
industry (and so take prices as given), and investors have claims to the proﬁts of ﬁrms. So
investors make their investment decisions with the aim of maximizing proﬁts.
Suppose the economy inherits a price level Po = 1. Then taking price level P as given,





PE[S|Ω]Kα − (1 + r)K,
where E[S|Ω] = P(G|Ω)G + P(B|Ω)B, the expected productivity level, and r is the (nominal)
interest rate. Here, PE[S|Ω]K is the (nominal) return from investment and (1+r)K is the cost;
e.g., if investors borrowed K at the interest rate r.
For any given interest rate and investors’ beliefs about the state of the economy, the ﬁrst order





1−α . By letting ln(1 + r) ≈ r,
we can write (the log of) investment as k = 1
1−α [lnαE[S|Ω] − (r − lnP)]. Since we assumed
initial price level of Po = 1, we can replace lnP with E[π|Ω], investors’ expectation of inﬂation.




[lnαE[S|Ω] − (r − E[π|Ω])]. (3)
As expected, aggregate investment increases with investors’ expectations about the state of the
economy, but falls in the ex-ante real interest rate, r−E[π|Ω]. Substituting this into the produc-
tion function, (the log of) aggregate output in state S can be written as:
y = lnS + γ [lnαE[S|Ω] − (r − E[π|Ω])], (4)
where γ = α/(1 − α). In equilibrium, expectations of inﬂation must be consistent: using equa-
tion (1), this gives
E[π|Ω] = r −
1
γ
(E[lnS|Ω] − P(G|Ω)yG − P(B|Ω)yB) − lnαE[S|Ω], (5)
The expression for E[π|Ω] shows that interest rate policy has both a direct and indirect aﬀect
on expectation of inﬂation: the direct eﬀect shows up in ﬁrst term on the RHS of (5), whereas it
impacts indirectly on E[π|Ω] through its eﬀect on investors’ information, Ω. This is the signaling
8eﬀect. Plugging this into equation (4), we can then write aggregate output (and hence, demand)
in state S as:
y = lnS − E[lnS|Ω] + P(G|Ω)yG + P(B|Ω)yB (6)
We now analyze a benchmark case in which signals are publicly observable. By pinning down
ﬁrst-best levels of investment as well as optimal policy choices, the analysis of the public signal
case facilitates our subsequent analysis of the nature of the policy ineﬃciency. The analysis in
the benchmark case will also show that the policy ineﬃciencies that we uncover are due to the
asymmetry in information, rather then the aggregate uncertainty about the productivity shock.
3.1 Monetary Policy in a First-Best World: Public Signal Case
Consider a situation where the policymaker and investors observe a signal s. Then for brevity,
we can write investors’ information set as Ω = {s}. The monetary authority then chooses r to
solve the following problem:
max
r E[V |s] = max
r λE[y|s] − (1/2)E[π2|s],





(E[lnS|s] − P(G|Ω)yG − P(B|Ω)yB) + lnαE[S|Ω] (7)
with Ω = {s}. Thus, monetary policy prescribes a rule that matches ω and s to the interest rate
policy. The equilibrium policy in the benchmark case also yields a number of features about our
economy which are consistent with our understanding of macroeconomic activity. To facilitate
comparison in the future, we brieﬂy describe these characteristics:
Investment and output levels: Using equation (3), it can easily be shown that when the signal
is publicly available, k|s=g − k|s=b = 1
α [P(G|g) − P(G|b)] > 0. That is, the aggregate investment
level is higher when the signal is good than when it is bad. This also means that output will be
higher when signs point to strong, rather than weak, economic fundamentals. Notice that since
a good signal results in a higher level of economic activity, there may well be an incentive for the
policymaker to conceal a bad signal when information is private. We explore such incentives in
section 3.2.
Ex-ante inﬂation level: When the signal is publicly observable, the ex-ante inﬂation rate is
equal to the desired level, zero. And since beliefs are consistent, investors also expect inﬂation
to be zero; i.e., E[π|s] = E[π|Ω] = 0. So, unlike discretionary policymaking in the conven-
tional monetary policy models (e.g., Barro and Gordon (1983 a,b), Persson and Tabellini (1993),
9Svensson (1997)), the interest rate policy with symmetric information does not result in a posi-
tive inﬂation-bias. The reason is that, in the full-information case, the central bank internalizes
fully the impact of its policy on investors’ expectation of inﬂation since the interest rate policy is
observed by investors before any expectations are formed. In other words, policymaking is equiv-
alent to the pre-commitment solution in these earlier models, which also yields zero expected
inﬂation.
Ex-post inﬂation level: Conditional on observing the signal s, the level of inﬂation is higher
when the underlying state is revealed to be bad, rather than when it is revealed to be good.
Furthermore, regardless of the state of the economy, inﬂation levels are higher if a good (rather
than a bad) signal is observed. To see these above relationships ﬁrst notice that, the unbalanced
posteriors imply that, ex-post, inﬂation diﬀers from its expectation: In a good state, the inﬂation
level will be πs
G = −βP(B|s) < 0, since the economy will be growing at a rate lower than its
“potential”; whereas inﬂation is πs
B = βP(G|s) > 0 if a bad state occurs. That is, prices rise if
the productivity level is wrongly perceived to be high, so that the economy expanded beyond its
‘potential.’
We are interested in analyzing the case where the central bank’s information (i.e., the signal
s) is private. In order to facilitate exposition, we restrict parameters to capture two scenarios
which we believe to be of interest. Notice that the diﬀerence in the optimal policies across good












− (P(G|g) − P(G|b))

,
which can be greater than or less than zero, depending on the parameter values. We want to
restrict parameter values so that when investors are very optimistic (pessimistic) about economic
fundamentals, but the central bank’s information suggest otherwise, then the ﬁrst-best policy
requires that monetary policy should be contractionary (expansionary).
To see why we impose this restriction, consider an economy that is experiencing a recent
run-up in asset prices. This will typically be accompanied by a high degree of investor optimism.
However, the central bank may be uncertain whether the rise in asset prices is driven by strong
economic fundamentals (i.e., high productivity or good technological shock) or if this is partly
due a to “bubble” shock. In a ﬁrst-best (public signal) world, if the policymaker believes that
the rise in asset prices is based on strong economic fundamentals, then we want our monetary
authority to retain the relatively low interest rate. On the other hand, if the monetary authority
believes that there may be some “irrational exuberance,” then parameters should be such that
our ﬁrst-best optimal policy involves a rise in interest rates in order to ‘prick the bubble.’
10In contrast, consider a second scenario where private agents are pessimistic about economic
fundamentals (i.e., ω is small). In such times, if investor pessimism of a weak economy is
conﬁrmed by the policymaker’s information, then a low interest rate policy to stimulate the
economy should be warranted. We would like to capture this scenario with parameter values
that ensure that when ω is small, then ro
b(ω) < ro
g(ω).
Assumption 1: We assume that 2e
1








Lemma 1 If Assumption 1 holds and φ → 1, then there exists some ωo such that ro
g(ω) > ro
b(ω)
if ω < ωo and ro
g(ω) < ro
b(ω) when ω > ωo.
Lemma 1 provides parametric restrictions which are suﬃcient to guarantee that interest rates
will be relatively higher (lower) when investors are optimistic (pessimistic) about the economy’s
path of future output, and a bad signal is publicly observed.8
3.2 Monetary Policy in the Private Signal Case
We now suppose that the signal s is private information to the central bank. In this case,
investors glean one of three things from the central bank’s interest rate policy: (i) whether the
signal received by the central bank is good; (ii) whether the signal is bad; or (iii) the monetary
policy provides no additional information to them, in which case investors continue to hold their
priors, ω. Accordingly, the question we ask is: Given ω, will the central banker ever ﬁnd it optimal
to deviate from the ﬁrst-best policy, ro
s(ω), prescribed by the signal she receives? Equivalently,
when (and how) does the central bank reveal its information to investors when the signals are
private?
We ﬁrst look for the conditions under which a separating equilibrium exist with r ∈ {ro
b,ro
g},
by focusing our attention on the incentives faced by a policymaking monetary authority that
observes a bad signal (i.e., type b policymaker). To examine this, consider a deviation from
ro
b to ro
g by a policymaker who has received a bad private signal, and let E[V |b,rs] be the
expected payoﬀ when the interest rate rs is chosen after receipt of the private signal b. We deﬁne
∆ ≡ E[V |b,ro
g] − E[V |b,ro
b], as the net gain from deviation, if investors interpret the deviation
as a good signal.
8However, as we will see, Assumption 1 (hence, Lemma 1), is only necessary in facilitating our discussion in
section 4. It does not aﬀect our qualitative results. What we need to keep in mind is the level of the optimal
interest rate policy in the private information case, relative to the ﬁrst-best (symmetric information) policy, given
ω and s.
11Then, after a few steps of algebra (as shown in the appendix on page 22), we obtain
∆(ω) = λ[P(G|g) − P(G|b)] − (β2/2)[P(G|g) − P(G|b)]
2 (8)
The diﬀerence in payoﬀs has two opposing terms: a positive term resulting from the gain in
output, and a negative term due to the inﬂationary consequences of deviating.9 By setting the
rate rg, the central bank is able to induce investors to increase the level of investment, resulting
in greater output. This gain shows up in the ﬁrst term on the RHS of equation (8). However
because the signal received by the central bank was actually bad, it is more likely that total
investment and output would exceed their desired levels (since the economy is likely to have
a low full-employment potential output level). This helps to trigger inﬂation, as shown in the
second term in (8). In the proposition that follows, we establish that there exist parameter values
for which the monetary authority prefers to deviate from a policy in accordance with its private
signal.
Proposition 1 If the output elasticity of inﬂation is suﬃciently low (i.e., β < 2
√
λ), then there
exists ω,ω (where ω ≤ 1
2 ≤ ω) such that the monetary authority has an incentive to:
(i) deviate from the ﬁrst-best interest rate if investors have suﬃciently “optimistic” or “pes-
simistic” priors about of the strength of underlying fundamentals, i.e. ∆ > 0 if either ω ≥ ω or
ω ≤ ω;
(ii) choose a policy in accordance with the optimal ﬁrst-best interest rate if investors are suﬃ-
ciently uncertain about the underlying state i.e. ∆ < 0 if ω ∈ (ω,ω).
Proposition 1 states that the incentive to adopt or deviate from the ﬁrst-best policy depends
on output elasticity of inﬂation, β, and investors’ priors. If β is large, then the inﬂationary cost
of a deviation from the ﬁrst-best interest rate policy more than oﬀsets the gain in output. Hence,
there will be no incentive to deviate. However, when inﬂation is suﬃciently inelastic in output
— as most estimates of β will suggest10 — then the inﬂationary cost per output gain is so small
that the central bank may ﬁnd it optimal to deviate from ro
b whenever it observes a bad signal.
This occurs if β < 2
√
λ.
Strikingly, proposition 1 also shows that policy ineﬃciency is most likely to occur precisely
when investors are most conﬁdent about the underlying fundamentals, i.e., priors are suﬃciently
9Note that such incentives do not exist for a central bank that receives a good signal. To see this, deﬁne
E[V |g,rg] to be the type-g central bank’s payoﬀ from following its signal and setting r = rg, and let let E[V |g,rb]
be her payoﬀ from deviating to rb. Then the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between deviating and choosing rg will be given by





< 0. Hence, the type-g policymaker
never ﬁnds it optimal to set a the rate rb. Doing so hurts the bank both in terms lower output and higher inﬂation
variability.
10For example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) estimated that the output elasticity of inﬂation is about 0.14
when inﬂation is expressed at annual terms. See also Rudebusch (2002). We are grateful to Carl Walsh for alerting
us to this.
12skewed with ω close to one or zero. This is because, when investors are very optimistic about the
path of future output, a relevant consideration is that by contradicting the market’s and his own
prior, the central bank could be signaling that he is no longer conﬁdent about the appropriate
course of action. Conversely, if investors are pessimistic about the economy, the bank becomes
concerned that by choosing the low, but eﬃcient policy, she will only be conﬁrming the negative
priors held by investors. Indeed, it is the fear of the economic consequences of being perceived
by investors as uncertain and less than conﬁdent about the economy’s fundamentals, that gives
the central bank an incentive to deviate and choose a policy that does not accord with its private
information.
The intuition for this result is best understood by considering the case where ω → 1, with
φ > ω. Here the priors of the market and the monetary authority are such that both expect a
productive economic environment with high returns. Now if the monetary authority receives the
private signal b, then its posterior P(G|b) → 1/2. Therefore, adoption of policy ro
b, will signal
to the market that the monetary authority is very uncertain about the underlying state. This
uncertainty will result in investors optimally choosing a much lower level of investment, thereby
depressing output. In contrast, if the monetary authority deviated and chose ro
g, then investment
is higher not just because of a lower interest rate, but also because the policy is in accordance
with the priors of the market. Of course, doing so runs the risk of igniting inﬂation. But this
eﬀect is minimal when the inﬂationary cost per output gain, β2/λ, is low. Thus, the monetary
authority will have the incentive to choose an ineﬃcient policy when ω is high.
In contrast, consider the case where the market and the central bank are both, ex-ante,
uncertain about the underlying state, i.e., ω ≈ 1/2. The monetary authority then recognizes that
its policy direction becomes the predominant source of information for investors. Hence, upon
receipt of the signal b, she is very conﬁdent that the underlying state is B and the policy ro
b is
‘appropriate’. If the policymaker deviates from this policy and chooses ro
g, then more investment
will be forthcoming as investors perceive the policy to mean a good state, thus increasing output.
However, the positive impact of this deviation on output is more than oﬀset by the serious threat
of inﬂation, as output exceeds the economy’s potential given the underlying productivity. Hence,
as ω → 1/2, the central bank adopts the ﬁrst-best policy rule.
Notice that the central bank’s incentive to “follow the market” when ω is high, or “assure the
market” when ω is low, introduces a credibility problem quite distinct from that of conventional
monetary policy models. In the literature, the central banks’ objectives (e.g., Faust and Svensson
(2001)), or its incentive to increase output through inﬂation surprises, has been the focus of its
credibility. Such issues are not present here. Rather, the central bank’s problem is how to credibly
13signal its information to investors when that information contrasts with investors expectation
about the path of future output. It is not clear that this problem can easily be resolved, even
in a dynamic framework. Too see this, suppose ω is low, and s = g. Then credibility building
requires that the central bank set r = ro
g(ω), and use public statements to assure investors that
it has received a good signal. But given that the central bank is also uncertain about the state
of the economy (recall that, P(G|g) → 1/2 if ω is low, and φ → 1), this strategy may actually
hurt its reputation in the future.11
Hence, when prior beliefs are suﬃciently skewed, the policymaker’s behavior is governed by
one of two possibilities: either a pooling equilibrium at some interest rate r∗(ω), or a separating
equilibrium in which upon receipt of a good signal, the central bank sets an interest rate higher
than ro
g(ω). We examine each of these cases in turn.
Pooling Equilibria : Suppose that there is considerable consensus shared by the market and the
monetary authority that the underlying state of the economy is either good or bad. If there
exists a pooling equilibrium, the policymaker’s choice of interest rate provides no information to
investors, who continue to maintain their prior beliefs about the economy. To solve for a pooling
equilibrium, we determine the optimal choice of interest rate when the signal is good. That is,




, subject to (1), (6) and E[π|ω] is given
by (5), with Ω replaced with ω.
The solution to the monetary authority’s problem in this case gives the nominal interest rate:
r∗(ω) = β(P(G|g) − ω) +
1
γ
[E[lnSω] + γ lnαE[Sω] − ωyG − (1 − ω)yB)] (9)
where E[Sω] = ωG + (1 − ω)B. Investors expectations of inﬂation in this case will be E[π|ω] =
β(P(G|g) − ω) > 0. The output level is then given by y = lnS − E[lnSω] + ωyG + (1 − ω)yB.
Notice that, since limφ→1,ω→1 P(G|g) = 1, expectations of inﬂation will be close to zero in a
pooling equilibrium in which ω → 1.
Separating Equilibrium with r > ro
g: Suppose we are in a situation where the priors of the market
and of the policymaker are suﬃciently skewed, being either very pessimistic (i.e. ω < ω) or very
optimistic (i.e. ω > ω). Now consider the monetary policymaker’s attempt to signal conﬁdence
that the state is good, by trying to separate itself from a less conﬁdent policymaker. For such a
separating equilibrium to exist, the monetary authority’s choice of the interest rate must satisfy
two conditions:
11This issue is explored more fully by Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe (2003) in a dynamic framework.
14(i) ﬁrst, the interest rate must be high enough (r > ro
g) to ensure that the monetary pol-
icymaker who has received the good signal, is able to eﬀectively separate itself from its
counterpart who received a bad signal;
(ii) the choice of interest rate should not be ‘too high’, otherwise, the policymaker with the
good signal may just ﬁnd it optimal to set the pooling rate r∗(ω) in equation (9).
In order to restate these two conditions that guarantee a separating equilibrium, we ﬁrst
deﬁne E[V |g,r > ro
g] as the bank’s expected payoﬀ from choosing an (separating) interest rate
r > ro
g, on receipt of private signal g. Similarly, deﬁne E[V |g,r∗] as the corresponding payoﬀ
in a (possible) pooling equilibrium. The ﬁrst condition (i), then says that the diﬀerence in the
central bank’s payoﬀ from choosing a higher interest rate, rather than the pooling interest rate
r∗(ω) must be positive: a few steps of algebra (as in the derivation of (8)) yields
∆∗
g = E[V |g,r > ro
g] − E[V |g,r∗] = λ[P(G|g) − ω] − (1/2)(r − ro
g)2 ≥ 0 (10)
The term in the square brackets on the RHS of (10) is the gain in output from eﬀectively signaling
to investors that the economic fundamentals are, in fact, strong. However, investors revise their
expectations of inﬂation upwards, and this helps to trigger an inﬂation rate above zero. [More
on this in Lemma 2, below]. The loss due to an increase in inﬂation is shown in the second term.
Hence, (10) provides a necessary condition for a monetary authority who receives a good signal
to eﬀectively separate itself from one who receives a bad signal.
Similarly, corresponding to condition (ii) above, the monetary authority must not ﬁnd it
optimal to mimic the higher rate r > ro
g if it receives a bad signal. If we deﬁne ∆∗
b as the net gain
from mimicking the higher interest rate policy, rather than follow the prescribed policy, despite
receiving a bad signal, then accordingly we have:
∆∗
b = E[V |b,r]−E[V |b,ro
b] = λ[P(G|g)−P(G|b)]−(1/2)[(r−ro
g)+β(P(G|g)−P(G|b))]2 ≤ 0 (11)
If these two conditions are satisﬁed, then on receiving a good signal the monetary policy
authority sets an interest rate r > ro
g, which credibly signals to investors that it received a good
signal. But since the ﬁrst-best policy ro
g(ω) also conveys the same information, when it is credible,
we have the following result:
Lemma 2 Suppose a separating equilibrium exists for some ω, such that the monetary authority
sets r > ro
g(ω) if a good signal is observed. Then if investors interpret this higher interest rate
policy as a good signal, their expectation of inﬂation will be given by E[π|r > ro
g] = r − ro
g > 0.
15Lemma 2 states that if the market’s priors are suﬃciently optimistic or pessimistic then, upon
receipt of a good signal, a relatively tighter monetary policy results in an increase in investors’
expectations of inﬂation. To see the underlying intuition, recall that investors observe the choice
of interest rate before making their investment decisions. This implies that if interest rates are
higher than the ﬁrst-best level, investors infer that the central bank must be very conﬁdent about
the state of the economy, otherwise it would have opted for a lower, ﬁrst-best interest rate policy,
ro
g(ω). This in turn leads to a higher investment. But the resulting higher aggregate investment
level will ignite inﬂation if the economy’s fundamentals are indeed weaker. Put diﬀerently, a
higher than expected rate provides a favorable assessment of productivity, but an unfavorable
assessment of inﬂation (see, for example, Romer and Romer (2000)). Since investors do recognize
this, it leads to an upward revision of their expectations of inﬂation.
Our main result, detailing the cases in which the two conditions for a separating equilibrium
hold simultaneously, is stated in the next proposition. It also demonstrate the existence of both
pooling and separating equilibria.
Proposition 2 Suppose β < 2
√
λ, and ω 6∈ [ω,ω]. Then there exists some ω∗, such that the
monetary authority,
(i) ﬁnds itself in a hybrid separating equilibrium where it chooses an ineﬃciently high interest
rate on receipt of a good signal if ω ∈ (ω < ω) or ω ∈ (ω,ω∗), and chooses the ﬁrst-best interest
rate ro
b(ω) on receipt of a bad signal.
(ii) ﬁnds itself trapped in a pooling equilibrium when prior beliefs are suﬃciently high, i.e. if
ω∗ < ω < 1, the central bank chooses r = r∗(ω) regardless of its signal.
The above proposition depicts the central bank’s dilemma. When the market consensus is
suﬃciently skewed, the monetary authority has no easy way of conveying through its policy
choice, the information it has received. This implies that a policymaker faces two options —
either to ineﬃciently raise interest rates or an ineﬃcient pooling interest rate that does not
convey its private information to the market.
To see the intuition underlying this ineﬃciency, consider ﬁrst Proposition 2(i). This says
that through a tighter monetary policy, a central bank is able to resolve the credibility prob-
lem when investors are either pessimistic or are moderately optimistic about the path of future
output. Consider ﬁrst the pessimistic case, where investors believe that economic fundamentals
are weak. Here the central bank recognizes that choosing the appropriate interest rate policy ro
b
only conﬁrms investors pessimism, leading to a further dampening of investment and even worse
output growth. So, investors rationally expect that the central bank has an incentive to set the
interest rate at ro
g in order to signal that economic fundamentals are actually strong. This results
16in the central bank choosing an interest rate that is ineﬃciently higher than ro
g when it actually
receives a good signal. As shown in Lemma 2, this causes investors to revise their expectations
of inﬂation upwards. The result is that the ex-ante real rate falls to a level that enables ﬁrms
to invest as much as they would have if the signals were publicly available. Therefore, as with
discretionary policymaking in models of monetary policy games, average inﬂation rates will be
positive, with no extra gain in output (relative to the public signal case).
In contrast when investors are moderately optimistic about economic fundamentals (i.e.,
investors are moderately optimistic with ω ∈ (ω,ω∗)), the policymaker faces a similar dilemma.
To see this notice that when the market is optimistic then two forces are at work. On the one
hand, the policymaker should raise interest rates and dampen investment, in order to ‘prick any
bubble’ that may be forming due to the possible divergence between private sector beliefs and
underlying fundamentals. On the other hand, the policymaker has an incentive to not confound
the market’s prior expectations of the underlying state of the economy. This is not only because
the unexpected choice of a higher interest rate signals the policymaker’s worries about weak
fundamentals. It is also because by going against the market’s prior, the policymaker also signals
his own uncertainty about the right course of action, since the posterior becomes more balanced.
Due to the latter concern, investors rationally expect that the central bank has an incentive
to choose the interest rate policy ro
g, so as to conﬁrm their prior beliefs. The resulting credibility
problem forces the central bank to set a relatively higher and ineﬃcient rate when it sees a
good signal, and the eﬃcient rate ro
b if a bad signal is observed. But once again resolving such
credibility problem here is costly. In particular, investors revise their expectations of inﬂation
upwards, leading to a positive rate of inﬂation. If investors are very optimistic (such that any
further conﬁrmation of their optimism has little impact on aggregate investment), then the
gain in output is more than oﬀset by the cost of higher inﬂation expectations. Hence, the
separating equilibrium is only optimal when investors are moderately optimistic (i.e., ω ∈ (ω,ω∗)
in proposition 2(i)).
Finally, suppose there is an overwhelming consensus in the market that fundamentals are
very strong. For these ‘very’ high levels of optimism, the central bank sets the interest rate r∗(ω)
regardless of its information, ensuring a pooling equilibrium (proposition 2(ii)). This results in
a striking outcome: It says that if optimism about ‘strong’ fundamentals is overwhelming, then
the policymaker will keep rates lower than ro
b, even if her private information may suggest that
such optimism is unwarranted and a ‘bubble’ may well be in the making. Somewhat ironically,
it is precisely the monetary authority’s desire to please the market by making decisions that the
‘market wants to see’, that results in this ineﬃciency.
174 Monetary Policy, Investment and Inﬂation: A Discussion
In an uncertain world, we have shown that monetary policy is subject to ineﬃciencies. Indeed,
such ineﬃciencies are particularly likely when there is considerable consensus amongst market
participants about the appropriate course of action. We now sketch the impact on inﬂation,
investment as well as the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy to describe some scenarios of contem-
poraneous interest. While our analysis is somewhat heuristic, we do believe that it throws light
on some of the dilemmas faced by central bankers in many economies.
(i) Inability of monetary authority to “prick a bubble”: Though our analysis is essentially static,
it does have some interesting implications on the persistence of high asset valuation. Consider a
scenario where investors are very optimistic about economic fundamentals, and this manifested
itself in the form of higher asset prices as arguably occurred in U.S. economy in the late 1990s.
Such investor optimism is analogous to a situation where ω > ω∗. We have shown in Proposition
2(ii) that, even if the central banker has private information that these optimistic expectations
are unwarranted, it may ﬁnd itself trapped into implementing a policy which conforms to investor
expectations — and fail to raise interest rates. It is also easy to show that aggregate investment
at the pooling equilibrium will be higher than what it would have been if signals were publicly
available: i.e., k∗ − ko
b = 1
α(ω − P(G|b)) > 0. This higher investment level further reinforces the
inﬂated asset values. So a “price bubble” could persist for a while, due to an unreasonably high
degree of optimism.
This accords well with the Japanese monetary authority’s inertia in raising interest rates over
the period 1985-89.12 Furthermore, this also throws light on the slow response of monetary au-
thorities in raising interest rates to dampen the real estate bubble in Thailand and South Korea
prior to the crisis in 1997. More controversially, a number of inﬂuential economists have also
argued that even as (the Federal Reserve chairman) Mr. Alan Greenspan’s statement on “irra-
tional exuberance” in December 1996 seemed to indictae the Fed’s concern for overinvestment,
the Federal Reserve was not suﬃciently aggressive in raising interest rates to gently deﬂate the
emerging bubble (See, for example, Cechetti (2002) and The Economist, Jan. 18th, 2003, p.72).
Our analysis provides an explanation of how such “validation of the market” could result.
(ii) An ineﬃciently ‘aggressive’ central banker: In the hybrid separating equilibrium, i.e., ω < ω
or ω ∈ (ω,ω∗), the central bank always adopts the eﬃcient policy ro
b when it receives a bad
signal, but an ineﬃciently higher interest rate policy when the signal is good. As noted earlier,
12Olivier Blanchard (2000) is an excellent (and very prescient) discussion of bubbles and the role of monetary
policy.
18this ineﬃciency occurs because for this range of priors, the central bank’s information can not
be credibly conveyed to investors using the ﬁrst-best policy. For example, when the market
expects a productivity slowdown, investors recognize that the central bank has an incentive
not to set r = ro
b, since this will conﬁrm the market’s pessimism and lead to an even worse
economic performance. So upon receipt of a good signal, the central bank “goes out on a limb”
by implementing a tighter monetary policy, relative to the ﬁrst-best, in order to signal to investors
that economic fundamentals remain strong. Although this helps to boost investment and output,
expectations of inﬂation increases, and this causes average inﬂation level to be higher than the
desired level of zero.
(iii) Positive expected inﬂation level: It is worth noting that there is a diﬀerence between the
positive inﬂation rate result here and the inﬂation-bias result in the seminal papers by Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983 a,b), as well as most of the literature that
followed in their wake. In these models, the bias in inﬂation arises because of a central banker’s
incentive to increase output by springing an ‘inﬂation surprise.’13 This type of time-inconsistency
problem is not present in our model. Instead, investors observe the direction of monetary policy
before investment decisions are undertaken, and so the interest rate policy can be used to shape
investors’ expectations about the state of the economy. This creates a credibility problem about
what the central bank really knows; and this problem is intensiﬁed when a high degree of con-
sensus about the state of the economy already exist among investors; i.e., when ω is very high or
low. Resolving this credibility problem with a relatively tighter monetary policy when s = g is
what leads to higher average inﬂation levels.
This result accords well with the evidence in Romer and Romer (2000). Indeed, Romer and
Romer also ﬁnd that commercial forecasters seem to infer that a rise in the interest rate signals
the receipt of unfavorable information about inﬂation by the Federal Reserve. Accordingly, these
forecasters also revise their forecasts of inﬂation upwards. This result could partly explain the
ﬁnding in Cook and Hahn (1989) and Kuttner (2001). The evidence in these two papers shows
that (unanticipated) increases in the Fed funds rate usually leads to increases in rates on bonds
of short to medium-term maturities; possibly, a result of the impact of such contractionary policy
on expectations of inﬂation. Thus, our framework provides a simple, theoretical underpinnings
for this empirical ﬁnding.
13The idea that a central banker has an incentive to “spring inﬂation surprises” in this class of models has
recently been criticized by Blinder (1998) and Howitt (2001). For example, Blinder asserted that “during my brief
career as a central banker, I never once witnessed nor experienced this temptation.” This sentiment is also echoed
by John Vickers, the chief economist at the Bank of England, who noted that “... we have no desire to spring
inﬂation surprises to try to bump output above its natural rate.” See Vickers (1999, p.6).
19The evidence in Orphanides (2001) suggests that the high inﬂation rate in the 1970s may
be due to a systematic misperception of the state of the economy by the Federal Reserve. This
explanation ﬁts well with our model. [See our brief discussion on page 5]. But our results also
suggest that there could be another reason for this: Since the 1974–1979 period immediately
followed the oil shock, the Federal Reserve and investors may have held opposing views about
the state of the economy. Such a scenario will correspond to investors priors given by ω < ω,
while the Fed believed that fundamentals were relatively stronger (i.e., s = g); exactly where we
ﬁnd that both interest rate and average inﬂation rate will be high.14
Our results can also explain the low inﬂation rates experienced in most advanced economies
in the past decade or so. It is widely believed that there are two reasons behind this success:
inﬂation targeting policy and increased transparency of monetary policy (e.g., Swanson (2004)).
First, central banks are increasingly adopting an inﬂation targeting policy — equivalent to a low
λ in our analysis. This lowers ω and increase ω, thus increasing the range of ω values for which
monetary policy becomes eﬃcient and more transparent. Secondly, if we deﬁne past estimate of
potential output as y = 1
2(yG+yB), then the current, stochastic potential output can be captured
with ˜ y = y +(ω − 1
2)(yG −yB). This implies that investors do not expect major economic shocks
if ω is close to 1
2; where we ﬁnd that the interest rate policy will be eﬃcient and information-
revealing, and average inﬂation rates will be low (Proposition 1(ii)). We are therefore inclined to
argue that the eﬀect of increased transparency on low inﬂation rates for most of the 1990s, was
aided by the fact that investors did not perceive any major shocks hitting the economy.15
(iv) Transparency and the Public Release of Information: It may seem that in order to eliminate
the bias in inﬂation (as well as most of the distortions in monetary policy), the central bank
can make its information publicly available (e.g, the Green Book forecasts in the U.S.), before
it decides on the direction of interest rate policy. But, notice an intriguing implication of our
analysis. An increase in publicly released information may result in greater consensus about the
underlying state of the world. And the consensus generated by this public release of information,
may itself result in ineﬃcient policies (recall that Proposition 1 holds for extreme values of ω).
More generally, since investors act after they have observed the interest rate policy, the
saying that “action speak louder than words” is particularly true when it comes to the credibility
14For example, the average rate on the six-month Treasury bill in 1960–73 was 4.6% and the inﬂation rate
averaged 3.3%. However, between 1974–78, while the nominal rate on the six-month Treasury bill rose to an
average of 6.5%, the inﬂation rate over the same period soared to an average of 7.3% (see Wilcox (1983)).
15Even in the case of over-investment, as occurred in the U.S. from late 1999 to 2001, our model predicts
relatively low rate of inﬂation. In our model, such a shock occurs when ω
∗ < ω < 1, and the expected inﬂation at
the pooling equilibrium here is given by β(P(G|g)−ω) > 0. Since ω → P(G|g) as ω → 1, the inﬂation rate is close
to the desired level of zero, even when investors seem to be overly optimistic.
20problem identiﬁed here. Investors may not accept at face value such public releases before a
policy is undertaken. As pointed by Romer and Romer (2000 p.456), they will be concerned that
the central bank may have an incentive to misrepresent information that they have received.
The reader may conjecture that the policy ineﬃciencies identiﬁed here can be eliminated with
reputation-building in a dynamic framework. But as we noted earlier, this may not be easy when
ω is low. However, it may be easier to use the ﬁrst-best policy, and public releases of information,
to build such reputation when investors are very optimistic (e.g., ω > ω∗) and the central bank
receives a good signal. This is because, not only is the central bank more conﬁdent about the
state of the economy (note that, P(G|g) → 1 if ω is high), but also if it is wrong, the market
would also be wrong, and this is not likely to hurt the central bank’s reputation.
5 Conclusion
Perhaps, the most diﬃcult part of monetary policymaking is that, at any time, there is some
degree of uncertainty about the state of the economy. This paper develops a parsimonious
framework to examine the impact of market expectations about the state of the economy on the
practice of monetary policy. We show that the eﬃcient policy is adopted only when investors are
suﬃciently uncertain about the economy. Strikingly, ineﬃcient choices in monetary policy are
most likely precisely when there is suﬃcient consensus in the economy.
We show that, indeed, a central bank may have an incentive to enact policies that the ‘market
wants to see’, rather than what is socially optimal. Our model also provides a framework that
simultaneously throws light on (i) why interest rates may not be high enough even when the
central bank’s information suggests that an increase in asset prices may be due to a bubble
shock; (ii) why the central bank may be reluctant to lower the interest rate when investors seem
to be very pessimistic (or moderately optimistic) about the path of future output; and (iii) why
we sometimes observe an upward revision of private sector’s forecasts of inﬂation whenever the
central bank tightens its monetary policy.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the ineﬃciency in monetary policy that we de-
lineate is distinct from the one emphasized in the vast literature on the time-inconsistency of
monetary policy. Accordingly, it shows how market expectations can trap policymakers into
enacting policies that result in a higher level of inﬂation — without appealing to the idea of
“inﬂation surprises.” Hence, it provides an alternative explanation of what may underlie high
inﬂation rates, especially during the 1970s.
21Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: First, notice that, by Bayes’ rule, the posterior beliefs that the state of
the economy is good will be given by:
P(G|g) =
ωφ
ωφ + (1 − ω)(1 − φ)
and P(G|b) =
ω(1 − φ)
ω(1 − φ) + (1 − ω)φ
(Ap.1)
Clearly, the limφ→1,ω→1 P(G|g) = 1 and limφ→1,ω→0 P(G|b) = 0. Now consider the limit of
P(G|b) as both φ and ω approaches 1. Since φ > ω, the limφ→1,ω→1 P(G|b) will be equivalent to
limφ→1,ω→φ P(G|b) = limφ→1
φ(1−φ)
φ(1−φ)+(1−φ)φ = 1
2. Similarly, since ω > 1−φ, the limφ→1,ω→0 P(G|g)
will be equivalent to limφ→1,ω→(1−φ) P(G|g) = 1
2. [Recall that P(B) = 1 − ω and P(b|B) = φ;
and since the signal is more informative than the prior, we have φ > 1 − ω or ω > 1 − φ].
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then there exists some ωo such that rg
o(ω) < rb
o(ω) whenever ω > ωo and rg
o(ω) > rb
o(ω) whenever
ω < ωo. But both inequalities in (Ap.2) hold by Assumption 1. q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 1: We ﬁrst derive equation (8). Notice that, if investors (correctly or
incorrectly) interpret the policy ro
b to mean a bad signal, their expectation of inﬂation, E[π|Ω] = 0.
Similarly, if they interpret the policy ro
g to mean a good signal, then they expect inﬂation to be
zero. [This can easily by veriﬁed by substituting ro
s in (7) into equation (5)].
Now, consider a deviation from ro
b to ro
g by the policymaker who has received a bad private
signal. Then, if investors interpret the deviation as a good signal, the expected payoﬀ of the
policymaker will be









P(B|b)[lnB − E[lnS|g] + P(G|g)yG + P(B|g)yB − yB]
2
On the other hand, if the monetary authority follows its signal and implements ro
b, then its
expected payoﬀ is








P(B|b)[lnB − E[lnS|b] + P(G|b)yG + P(B|b)yB) − yB]
2
Subtracting E[V |b,rb] from E[V |b,rg], and using our assumption that α(kG − kB) = yG − yB −
ln(G/B) = 1, we get



















So by continuity, if β < 2
√
λ, then there exists ω and ω, such that ∆(ω) < 0 if ω ∈ (ω,ω), and
∆(ω) > 0 otherwise. That is, the policymaker will have an incentive to deviate from ro
b when
ω < ω or ω > ω. q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof is straightforward and follows immediately from equation (5).
If investors interpret the policy r > ro
g as a good signal, then from equation (5),
E[π|r > ro
g] = r −
1
γ
(E[lnS|g] − P(G|g)yG − P(B|g)yB) − lnαE[S|g]
= r − ro
g
using equation (7). q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Suppose a separating equilibrium exists, in which upon receipt of
a bad signal, the central bank sets r = ro
b, but chooses a rate r > ro
g when the signal is good.
The tighter monetary policy r > ro
g must then satisfy two conditions, as indicated in equations
(10) and (11): i.e.,
λ(P(G|g) − ω) − (1/2)(r − ro
g)2 ≥ 0 (Ap.3)
and
λ[P(G|g) − P(G|b)] − (1/2)[r − ro
g + β(P(G|g) − P(G|b))]2 ≤ 0 (Ap.4)
By Propostion 1, we know that (Ap.4) holds for all ω 6∈ (ω,ω). Now ﬁx (r − ro
g), and
Now let φ → 1, then it can easily be shown that P(G|g)−P(G|b) is concave in ω, attaining a
maximum of 1 at ω = 1
2. Hence, if β < 2
√
λ, then ∆(ω) = λ[P(G|g)−P(G|b)]−(1/2)[β(P(G|g)−
P(G|b))]2 is positive, and decreasing in ω for ω > ω ≥ 1
2; but increasing in ω if ω < ω ≤ 1
2.
Secondly, notice that if φ → 1, then (P(G|g) − ω) → 1
2 as ω → 0, but (P(G|g) − ω) → 0 as ω
23approaches 1. Hence, we can ﬁnd a rate diﬀerential r−ro
g > 0, such that the (Ap.4) holds for all
ω 6∈ (ω,ω), but (Ap.3) holds only if ω < ω or ω ∈ (ω,ω∗), where ω∗ solves (Ap.3) with equality,
given the choice of r − ro
g. Hence, a separating equilibrium, with r > ro
g whenever s = g, exists
for ω < ω or ω ∈ (ω,ω∗).
(ii) Now suppose ω ∈ (ω∗,1). In this case, the central bank is unable to use its interest rate
policy to inﬂuence investors beliefs about the state of the economy. In order to determine whether
a pooling equilibrium exists at r∗(ω), we need to show that the policymaker has no incentive to
deviate from r∗(ω) if a bad signal is observed. [Recall, that r∗(ω) is the optimal policy if the
central bank sees a good signal, but unable to convey this to investors].
Suppose for this range of ω values, investors beliefs about the state of the economy when
r 6= r∗(ω) is given by Prob(G|r 6= r∗) = ρ. Then the optimal deviation when a signal s = b is




[E[lnSρ] + γ(lnα + lnE[Sρ]) − ρyG − (1 − ρ)yB)] + β(P(G|b) − ρ) (Ap.5)
where E[Sρ] = ρG + (1 − ρ)B.
Now consider a deviation from r∗(ω) to rρ(ω) when the central bank sees a bad signal about
the future path of output. Denote ∆ρ(ω) as the net gain from deviating to rρ(ω). Then, as before,
∆ρ(ω) will be given by
∆ρ(ω) = −λ(ω − ρ) + (β2/2)(P(G|g) − P(G|b))[(P(G|g) − ω) − (ω − P(G|b))] (Ap.6)
It is easy to show that (P(G|g) − ω) − (ω − P(G|b)) is negative for ω > 1/2, so that the RHS
of (Ap.6) is negative. Therefore, a pooling equilibrium with the interest rate r∗(ω) can be
supported with out-of-equilibrium beliefs given by ρ < ω. That is, a pooling equilibrium with
r = r∗(ω) exists for ω ∈ (ω∗,1) if investors are less conﬁdent of the state of the economy whenever
they observe an interest rate policy r 6= r∗(ω). q.e.d
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